The dire headlines coming fast and furious in the financial and popular press suggest that the housing crisis is intensifying. Yet it is very likely that April 2008 will mark the bottom of the U.S. housing market. Yes, the housing market is bottoming right now.
How can this be? For starters, a bottom does not mean that
prices are about to return to the heady days of 2005. That
probably won't happen for another 15 years. It just means
that the trend is no longer getting worse, which is the
critical factor.
Most people forget that the current housing bust is nearly
three years old. Home sales peaked in July 2005. New home
sales are down a staggering 63% from peak levels of 1.4
million. Housing starts have fallen more than 50% and,
adjusted for population growth, are back to the trough
levels of 1982.
Furthermore, residential construction is close to 15-year
lows at 3.8% of GDP; by the fourth quarter of this year, it
will probably hit the lowest level ever. So what's going to
stop the housing decline? Very simply, the same thing that
caused the bust: affordability.
The boom made housing unaffordable for many American
families, especially first-time home buyers. During the
1990s and early 2000s, it took 19% of average monthly income
to service a conforming mortgage on the average home
purchased. By 2005 and 2006, it was absorbing 25% of monthly
income. For first time buyers, it went from 29% of income to
37%. That just proved to be too much.
Prices got so high that people who intended to actually live
in the houses they purchased (as opposed to speculators)
stopped buying. This caused the bubble to burst.
Since then, house prices have fallen 10%-15%, while incomes
have kept growing (albeit more slowly recently) and mortgage
rates have come down 70 basis points from their highs. As a
result, it now takes 19% of monthly income for the average
home buyer, and 31% of monthly income for the first-time
home buyer, to purchase a house. In other words, homes on
average are back to being as affordable as during the best
of times in the 1990s. Numerous households that had been
priced out of the market can now afford to get in.
The next question is: Even if home sales pick up, how can
home prices stop falling with so many houses vacant and
unsold? The flip but true answer: because they always do.
In the past five major housing market corrections (and there
were some big ones, such as in the early 1980s when home
sales also fell by 50%-60% and prices fell 12%-15% in real
terms), every time home sales bottomed, the pace of
house-price declines halved within one or two months.
The explanation is that by the time home sales stop
declining, inventories of unsold homes have usually already
started falling in absolute terms and begin to peak out in
"months of supply" terms. That's the case right now: New
home inventories peaked at 598,000 homes in July 2006, and
stand at 482,000 homes as of the end of March. This
inventory is equivalent to 11 months of supply, a 25-year
high – but it is similar to 1974, 1982 and 1991 levels,
which saw a subsequent slowing in home-price declines within
the next six months.
Inventories are declining because construction activity has
been falling for such a long time that home completions are
now just about undershooting new home sales. In a few
months, completions of new homes for sale could be
undershooting new home sales by 50,000-100,000 annually.
Inventories will drop even faster to 400,000 – or seven
months of supply – by the end of 2008. This shift in
inventories will have a significant impact on prices,
although house prices won't stop falling entirely until
inventories reach five months of supply sometime in 2009. A
five-month supply has historically signaled tightness in the
housing market.
Many pundits claim that house prices need to fall another
30% to bring them back in line with where they've been
historically. This is usually based on an analysis of house
prices adjusted for inflation: Real house prices are 30%
above their 40-year, inflation-adjusted average, so they
must fall 30%. This simplistic analysis is appealing on the
surface, but is flawed for a variety of reasons.
Most importantly, it neglects the fact that a great majority
of Americans buy their houses with mortgages. And if one
buys a house with a mortgage, the most important factor in
deciding what to pay for the house is how much of one's
income is required to be able to make the mortgage payments
on the house. Today the rate on a 30-year, fixed-rate
mortgage is 5.7%. Back in 1981, the rate hit 18.5%.
Comparing today's house prices to the 1970s or 1980s, when
mortgage rates were stratospheric, is misguided and
misleading.
This is all good news for the broader economy. The housing
bust has been subtracting a full percentage point from GDP
for almost two years now, which is very large for a sector
that represents less than 5% of economic activity.
When the rate of house-price declines halves, there will be
a wholesale shift in markets' perceptions. All of a sudden,
the expected value of the collateral (i.e. houses) for much
of the lending that went on for the past decade will change.
Right now, when valuing the collateral, market participants
including banks are extrapolating the current pace of house
price declines for another two to three years; this has a
significant impact on the amount of delinquencies,
foreclosures and credit losses that lenders are expected to
face.
More home sales and smaller price declines means fewer
homeowners will be underwater on their mortgages. They will
thus have less incentive to walk away and opt for
foreclosure.
A milder house-price decline scenario could lead to
increases in the market value of a lot of the securitized
mortgages that have been responsible for $300 billion of
write-downs in the past year. Even if write-backs do not
occur, stabilizing collateral values will have a huge impact
on the markets' perception of risk related to housing, the
financial system, and the economy.
We are of course experiencing a serious housing bust, with
serious economic consequences that are still unfolding. The
odds are that the reverberations will lead to subtrend
growth for a couple of years. Nonetheless, housing led us
into this credit crisis and this recession. It is likely to
lead us out. And that process is underway, right now.
Mr. Moulle-Berteaux is managing partner of Traxis Partners
LP, a hedge fund firm based in New York.